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On July 31, 2014, President Obama introduced a new Executive Order to
federal contractors known as the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Order.' The
Order has several sections, one of which (Section Six) precludes pre-dispute
arbitration agreements from any federal contract worth over one million
dollars.2 This preclusion has sparked controversial ideas on where the
President obtained the power to enact such an order; whether the order will
face judicial review upon implementation; and how much of an effect the
ban on pre-dispute arbitration agreements will have on employee claims.
Despite the media's frequent headlines claiming that President Obama has
taken initiatives outside his power, the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Order,
also known as Executive Order 13673, has been justly enacted and should
have minimal impact on the economy or on individual employees bringing
claims that fall within the arbitration preclusion. Even without the mandated
arbitration agreement that federal employers were including in their
contracts, employees are incentivized to opt for arbitration over litigation.
This article begins with an analysis of the new Order, and then explains why
arbitration will still be the first choice dispute resolution method for
employees bringing those pertinent claims.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE FAIR PAY AND SAFE WORKPLACES
EXECUTIVE ORDER
Defining the Order and Its Implications
Executive Order 13673 contains several sections that are all designed to
improve workplace practices and increase general productivity with federal
contractors. The Order is broken into eight different objectives aimed to hold
corporations accountable, crack down on repeat violators, promote efficient
federal contracting, protect responsible contractors, focus on helping
companies improve, give employees a day in court and information about
their paycheck, and streamline implementation and overall contract
reporting.3 The Order is designed to accomplish these objectives through
disclosure requirements and setting boundaries on dispute resolution
' Jill Rosenberg & Gary Siniscalco, Obama Executive Order Places New Burdens
and Restrictions on Federal Contractors, EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION BLOG
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://blogs.orrick.com/employment/2014/08/05/759/.
' FACT SHEET: Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order, THE WHITE
HOUSE (July 31, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/07/31/fact-
sheet-fair-pay-and-safe-workplaces-executive-order.
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systems. The Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Order applies to all new federal
procurement contracts worth more than $500,000.4 It will be implemented in
stages throughout 2016,' so the effects of the Order will not actually be
known for several years.
Section Six, the complaint and dispute transparency section, is the main
concern for the purposes of this article. The language of this clause is:
Agencies shall ensure that for all contracts where the estimated value
of the supplies acquired and services required exceeds $1 million,
provisions in solicitations and clauses in contracts shall provide that
contractors agree that the decision to arbitrate claims arising under
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or any tort related to or
arising out of sexual assault or harassment may only be made with
the voluntary consent of employees or independent contractors after
such disputes arise. Agencies shall also require that contractors
incorporate this same requirement into subcontracts where the
estimated value of the supplies acquired and services required
exceeds $1 million.6
This provision does not apply to contracts or subcontracts for the acquisition
of commercial items or commercially available off-the-shelf items;
employees who are covered by any type of collective bargaining agreement
negotiated between the contractor and a labor organization representing
them; or to a contract that can't be modified and included an arbitration
agreement formed prior to the Order.' Section Six of the Order is one small
piece of the overall goal of the document, which is to maintain fair pay and
safe workplaces by regulating federal contracts and increasing compliance
with labor laws.'
There have been several bills presented to Congress in the past that have
tried to limit the use of arbitration from certain fields, yet none of these
managed to be enacted into law.9 The Arbitration Fairness Act would have
4
5Id
6 Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014).
7Id
8Id.
' Hans A. von Spakovsky, The Unfair Attack on Arbitration: Harming Consumers
by Eliminating a Proven Dispute Resolution System, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (July
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rendered all pre-dispute arbitration agreements invalid in employment,
consumer, antitrust, and civil rights disputes.'o The Arbitration Fairness for
Students Act similarly would have prohibited pre-dispute arbitration
agreements from colleges and universities that participate in federal student
assistance programs." The Consumer Mobile Fairness Act would have
invalidated pre-dispute arbitration clauses in contracts involving consumer
mobile services or mobile broadband Internet access service, and the
Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act would have invalidated pre-
dispute arbitration clauses between long-term care facilities and their
residents.12 There was also the Consumer Fairness Act, which tried to amend
the Consumer Credit Protection Act to define pre-dispute arbitration clauses
in consumer contracts to be an unfair and deceptive trade practice." As of
now, none of these acts trying to invalidate pre-dispute arbitration
agreements has been enacted into law because Congress has not been
convinced that arbitration actually is unfair or bad for consumers. " It
actually appears to be the opposite; that arbitration opens the door for
individuals to bring claims that they would not be able to bring in a purely
litigation resolution system."
II. PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO ENACT THE ORDER AND MINIMAL
EFFECT OF SCRUTINY
A. History of the President's Authority to Sign Executive Orders
In order to fully understand what gives the President the authority to
enact laws such as the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Order, it is essential to
go back to the year 1949.16 In this year, the Federal Property and
17, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/the-unfair-attack-on-
arbitration-harming-consumers-by-eliminating-a-proven-dispute-resolution-system.
1o See S. 878 and H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013). See also H.R. 4181, 112th Cong.
(2012) (barring arbitration agreements in employment contracts) and S. 2915, 111th
Cong. (2009-10) (making an agreement between an employer and employee to arbitrate
a claim of rape unenforceable).
" S. 3557, 112th Cong. (2012).
12 H.R. 6351, 112th Cong. (2012).
13 H.R. 991, 111th Cong. (2009).
14 von Spakovsky, supra note 9.
16 Peter M. Shane, Presidential Procurement Authority and Interests of Workers:
The Statutory Basis for Obama Executive Orders on Federal Contracting, ACS BLOG
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Administrative Services Act ("FPASA") was enacted by Congress in order to
empower the President to "prescribe policies and directives that the President
considers necessary to carry out" FPASA's purposes." These purposes
consist of establishing "an economical and efficient system for . . .
[p]rocuring and supplying property and nonpersonal services for the federal
government."" Presidents have relied upon the authority granted in FPASA
for many different initiatives." According to Peter Shane, an expert in
presidential powers, President Kennedy and President Johnson relied on the
FPASA to prohibit race discrimination among federal contractors.20
President Nixon also relied upon the 1949 Act when he sought equality in
employment and required federal contractors to engage in affirmative
action.2 1 Under FPASA, President Carter was able to require a system of
temporary wage and price controls on federal contractors, and President
Bush passed an order requiring that all federal contractors let their employees
know that they have a right not to join a union.22 Each of these orders has
been challenged in court and upheld,23 which indicates the strength of the
FPASA in protecting the President's authority to sign orders relating to
federal contracts.
B. Relation of the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Order to the Franken
Amendment
The Franken Amendment is a law issued on December 8, 2010 that
applies to any contract in excess of $1 million appropriated or otherwise
made available by the Fiscal Year 2010 Defense Appropriations Act and
executed after February 17, 2010 (the effective date of the Franken
Amendment). 24 This Amendment prohibits those funds for any contract that
(Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/presidential-procurement-authority-and-
interests-of-workers-the-statutory-basis-for-obama.
17 Id.
18 Id
19 Id.
20Id
21Id
22 Id
23 Id
24 Frank Murray, Assessing the Franken Amendment, LAW360 (Feb. 16, 2011),
http://www.foley.com/files/Publication/b7719898-dbl4-44bc-bc2d-b47ede0b7e6c/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/fdc6a5db-da4a-4517-bc83-b6679194089b/
AssessingTheFrankenAmendment.pdf.
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requires its employees to arbitrate a Title VII or tort claim arising out of
sexual assault or battery. 25 Essentially, the Franken Amendment "withhold(s)
defense contracts from companies . . . if they restrict their employees from
taking workplace sexual assault, battery and discrimination cases to court." 26
This makes President Obama's Executive Order an extension of the Franken
Amendment, now applicable to all federal contractors with contracts valued
at more than $1 million, not just federal defense contracts.
The Franken Amendment was pushed through Congress by Senator Al
Franken, who devised the change from a case involving a female who
claimed to be sexually assaulted while working in Iraq.27 Senator Franken
had a real battle to get the bill to pass, but was eventually successful. He
argued that:
Article 1 Section 8 of our Constitution gives Congress the right to
spend money for the welfare of our citizens. Because of this, Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote, 'Congress may attach conditions on the
receipt of federal funds and has repeatedly employed that power to
further broad policy objectives.' That is why Congress could pass
laws cutting off highway funds to states that didn't raise their
drinking age to 21. That's why this whole bill [the Defense
Appropriations bill] is full of limitations on contractors-what
bonuses they can give and what kind of health care they can offer.
The spending power is a broad power and my amendment is well
within it.28
25 Id
26 Cynthia Dizikes, Senate Passes Franken Amendment Aimed at Defense
Contractors, MINNPOST (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.minnpost.com/politics-
policy/2009/10/senate-passes-franken-amendment-aimed-defense-contractors.
27 Murray, supra note 24 (The case was that of Jamie Leigh Jones, who claimed to
have been raped by multiple men in her employer-provided housing while working in
Iraq. When she returned to the U.S., she tried to sue in court, but her employer, Kellogg
Brown & Root, sought to enforce the arbitration agreement in her employment contract
for any claim "related to her employment" or based on personal injury "arising in the
workplace." The court decided that Jones's claims were not related to her employment,
but Senator Franken insisted that his amendment was necessary to prevent other federal
defense contractors from requiring arbitration for their employees' sexual assault or
harassment claims.).
28 Dizikes, supra note 26.
184
[Vol. 31:2 2016]
ARBITRATION CLAUSE SHOULD NOT HAVE A RESOUNDING IMPACT
With these arguments, the bill was passed and was implemented in 2010.29
Despite the success of Franken's arguments in the Senate, there were still
some critics of the law even after its enactment. One opponent expressed his
view that, "Congress should not be involved in writing or rewriting private
contracts."o Those that held this view for an amendment put through by
Congress may certainly be opposed to essentially the same actions done by
solely the President on his own accord and authority, without the support of
the legislative body.
C. Basis for Judicial Challenge
Despite the overwhelming judicial support of orders signed on the basis
of FPASA, there is no guarantee that an order signed on this basis will be
upheld." President Clinton was not as successful in court when he tried to
back his attempt to use FPASA to prevent federal contractor employers from
permanently replacing employees while they were on strike.32 The court did
not; however, strike down this order on the basis of lack of authority, but
because it was in direct conflict with the National Labor Relation Act's
authorization for employers to replace strikers.3 3 There are "no statutes in
direct or even implicit conflict with the Obama orders," so the basis for the
only overturned FPASA executive order could not be considered the
29 Murray, supra note 24.
30 Dizikes, supra note 26.
For some of the arguments against upholding the order, see generally Jeff Leieritz,
ABC Asks President to Withdraw "Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces" Executive Order,
(Nov. 7, 2014), ASSOCIATED BUILDERS AND CONTRACTORS, INC.
http://www.abc.org/NewsMedia/NewsReleases/tabid/144/entryid/2937/-abc-asks-
president-to-withdraw-fair-pay-and-safe-workplaces-executive-order.aspx (saying that
"[t]his executive order dramatically changes the enforcement mechanisms carefully put
in place by Congress and needlessly adds uncertainty, subjectivity and onerous and costly
new data collection and reporting requirements for federal contractors"); PSC Tells White
House to Fix Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order, PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
COUNSEL (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.pscouncil.org/News2/NewsReleases/2014/
PSCTellsWhiteHousetoFixFair Pay andSafeWorkplacesExecutiveOrder
.aspx (stating that the "executive order is contrary to existing law, would result in
exorbitant increased costs to the government and companies, and lacks an executable
framework").
3 2 FACT SHEET: Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order, supra note 3.
" Shane, supra note 16.
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justifiable rationale for overturning Obama's Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces
order.34
Just because there has not yet been precedent of an executive order
derived under FPASA overturned for a reason other than conflicting statutes
does not mean it cannot occur. Peter Shane says that, "to be sustained under
FPASA, a presidential directive must have a rational, non-arbitrary
relationship to the goal of 'an economical and efficient system' of federal
procurement."3 5 He also explains why the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces
Order accomplishes that goal:
Executive Order 13673 does not spell out why employers with
million-plus dollar federal contracts should be barred from using
mandatory arbitration in civil rights and sexual harassment claims.
The rationale, however, seems plain. Unlawful discrimination and
sexual harassment both interfere with the economical and efficient
performance of contracts. The availability of mandatory arbitration,
which is less public and less costly for employers than litigation,
may reduce employer incentives to comply meticulously with the
law. By limiting the ban on mandatory arbitration to winners of large
contracts, the executive order holds in place whatever incentive for
legal compliance is created by potential litigation, while (a) leaving
employees of those contractors the option of arbitration where it
appears the favorable course and (b) still allowing smaller federal
contractors the benefits of lower-cost mandatory arbitration. 36
The argument of this article is that the Order remains in compliance with all
of the necessary requirements of a valid executive order just as Shane
suggests, and that employees should take advantage of "(b)," mentioned
above," by choosing arbitration even when it is not imposed upon them.
III. EMPLOYEES SHOULD STILL CHOOSE ARBITRATION PosT DISPUTE;
COMPARISON OF ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION
Although the Order now bans the use of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in relation to employees bringing sexual harassment or Title VII
34 Id
3 Id
36 Id
37Id
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claims, that does not mean that employees should not choose to voluntarily
pursue arbitration after the dispute arises as a resolution method. Section Six
is simply in place to prevent employers from making arbitration mandatory.
In a comparison of arbitration and litigation for these claims, employees
should voluntarily choose arbitration, making the effect of the applicable
provision of the Order minimal at best. There are many reasons why
employees will be enticed to bring their claims through arbitration instead of
litigation, including that arbitration generally takes less time, is more
reliable, and is cheaper than litigation, amongst many other reasons.
A. Arbitration Generally Takes Less Time than Litigation
The preclusion of appeal rights has often been the topic of controversy
for analysts of arbitration. On one hand, it leaves unsatisfied parties with no
means of review on the merits.38 On the other, it could potentially save both
parties significant amounts of money and time.39 In 2008, the median length
of time from the filing of an arbitration demand to the making of a final
award was 7.9 months.40 The 2010 litigation statistics say that the median
amount of time from filing to the end of trial in civil cases was 33.2 months,
and that amount is extended an additional 7 months to 40.8 months in cases
that were sent to appeal.4 1 In a case study focusing specifically on
employment dispute claims, the mean time to disposition in arbitration was
284.4 days for those that settled and 361.5 days for those that were issued
awards after a hearing.4 2 This aligns with the AAA Arbitration Roadmap,
which anticipates an average award being issued in 297 days. 43 In federal
" Edna Sussman & John Wilkinson, Benefits of Arbitration for Commercial
Disputes, ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, http://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/publications/disputeresolution magazine/March_2012_SussmanWil
kinsonMarch_5.authcheckdam.pdf.
39 Id
40 Id (Keep in mind that these statistics are for domestic commercial disputes, not
for the type of dispute under the EO. The litigation statistics were gathered from the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.)41Id
42 Colvin, Alexander, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case
Outcomes and Processes, IRL Collection at DigitalCommon@ILR (2011),
http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1586&context-articles.
11 AAA Arbitration Roadmap, American Arbitration Association Dispute Resolution
Services Worldwide (2007), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc= ADRSTG_003838
187
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
court for employment discrimination, the mean time to a hearing was 709
days, and in state court the mean was 723 days." An older study from 1997
also supports the finding that arbitration can move substantially faster than
litigation for employment claims.4 5 This data showed that the mean time
from filing to judgment for employment arbitration was 16.5 months, (495
days), while the average time from filing to judgment for litigation was 25
months (750 days).46 These studies show that employment related arbitration
has been consistently faster than employment related litigation over the past
twenty years.47 The more time spent on a lawsuit, the more resources go into
it.48 Employees have a lot of motivation to spend the least amount of both
time and money on their dispute resolution, especially when going against an
employer with unlimited resources.
B. Courts are Less Reliable Than Arbitral Tribunals
Despite the general feeling of reliability in the court structure, there is
still the chance that a "court crisis" could occur, limiting the availability of a
judicial setting in which to seek resolution and delaying the process even
further. In the early 2000s there were several courts that were forced to make
drastic changes that limited their ability to hear cases due to budget cuts. 4 9
While the chances of this set back arising in the judicial setting in which an
employee seeks to bring her case are unlikely, there are several instances
where this has actually happened.o One article provides a list of examples
that are eye opening to the effects that budget cuts can have on the judicial
system:
Oregon closed courthouses every Friday from March through June
and postponed processing minor criminal cases. Colorado froze
hiring throughout the court system and mandated eight days of
unpaid furlough for all court employees. Alabama temporarily
suspended jury trials in 2002. In 2002, Massachusetts cut 1,000 court
employees, with the result that judges in twenty-five Superior
4 Colvin, supra note 42.
45 Business-to-Business Mediation/Arbitration vs. Litigation, NAT'L ARBITRATION
FoRUM, Jan. 2005 at 4.
46 Id
47 Id. Colvin, supra note 42.
48 Id
49 Business-to-Business Mediation/Arbitration vs. Litigation, supra note 45, at 3.
50 Id
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Courtrooms had no support staff and stopped conducting civil trials.
New Hampshire suspended jury trials for two months in 2002 and
for three months in 2003.
Even though the chances of budget cuts impacting employment litigation
claims is not likely, it is something to keep in mind as an employee deciding
which avenue to bring a claim. Reliability of the resolution system is
essential to the completion of these cases, especially when they can drag on
for up to several years. Plaintiffs need to feel secure that their chosen method
will still be available as their case progresses, and governmental funding can
impact the security of the judicial system in a way that arbitral tribunals are
not exposed to. Even though the court systems have not yet completely
disappeared as an option for plaintiffs, all of these instances are examples of
when the absence of a court system has delayed the process and increased the
burden of dispute resolution. This delay affects all of the other factors that
are considered when making a resolution process decision, such as time,
money, and effectiveness.
C. Arbitration is Cheaper Than Litigation for Employees
One of the major benefits and goals of arbitration is to keep costs down
for the involved parties. This aspect of arbitration has been a selling point for
the resolution method since its creation, and probably the main reason that
federal contracts were continuously including pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration agreements prior to the Executive Order.52 There are many
reasons for the lower costs involved with arbitration: less discovery, lack of
" Id. (There are also several examples of judges speaking out about this "court
crisis". Kevin S. Burke, Chief Judge of the Minnesota's Fourth Judicial Court, expressed
concern about the effects court closings would have on the community as far as the
health of children, families, and the economy. This soon became reality for Minnesota
when the state suffered a $3 billion shortage of funding and the courts were forced to
raise civil court filing fees by $100 to $235 per case and imposed a fee of $55 for filing a
motion. A Los Angeles proposed budget would have forced the closing of sixty to one
hundred courtrooms country wide, but Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Robert A.
Dukes came forward and helped raise the budget to what was acceptable to prevent those
closures from occurring.)
52 See, e.g., Edna Sussman & John Wilkinson, Benefits of Arbitration for
Commercial Disputes, ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ publications/dispute resolution
magazine/March_2012_SussmanWilkinsonMarch_5.authcheckdam.pdf.
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ability to appeal, greater flexibility." In employment litigation, the median
total cost of the dispute is $88,000.54 The majority of that money (about
$40,000) is spent on the actual trial itself, over $15,000 is spent on discovery,
and just under $15,000 is spent on pre-trial tasks. The remaining $18,000 is
spent on court and filing fees and post-trial costs. 6
The reason why the actual trial period of litigation is so expensive is
because of the amount of time it entails and the attorney's fees that cumulate
over that amount of time." These fees are minimized in arbitration because
of the shorter time period that a dispute resolution takes." Costs are also
reduced in other areas, such as discovery. Recently, the Labor, Employment,
and Elections Division of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA")
created the AAA Initial Discovery Protocols for Employment Arbitration
Cases.5 9 These protocols were designed to encourage parties to exchange
information relevant to the case early on in the resolution process in order to
increase speed and effectiveness.6 o Pre-trial expenses are also narrowed in
arbitration in certain areas, such as evidentiary issues, voir dire, jury charges,
broad motion practice, proposed findings of fact, authentication of
documents, qualification of experts, and cumulative witnesses.'
As far as the cost to file a claim in either arbitration and litigation goes,
arbitration comes out easily the better choice for an employee looking to
bring a claim.62 In a study based upon American Arbitration Association
calculations and 3,945 arbitration cases, the mean arbitration fees (not
including the cost of an attorney), were $6,340 per case total and $11,070 for
cases disposed of by an award following a hearing.6 3 In 97% of these cases
53 Id
54 Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil
Litigation, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS (Jan. 2013),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/-/media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csphonline2.ash
x.
55 Id
56 Id
" Sussman & Wilkinson, supra note 52.
58 Id
5 AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS,
(May 15, 2014).
60 Id
61 Sussman & Wilkinson, supra note 52.
62 AM. ARBrrRATION Ass'N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION
PROCEDURES (Nov. 1, 2014), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF
?doc=ADRSTAGE2025292.
63 Id.
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the employer paid the entire cost of the arbitration fees beyond a small filing
fee, pursuant to AAA procedures.' For disputes arising out of employment
agreements, the employee is responsible for a filing fee capped at $200, and
the employer pays a significantly higher fee based upon a fee schedule.6 5 On
the other hand, litigation fees all depend on the type of case and damages
sought, amongst an array of other factors that all add up quickly. The fact
arbitration has a set filing fee for employees is a definite benefit for an
individual trying to keep costs at a minimum.
While it is easy to see why employees would want to keep their own
costs down when pursuing a claim against their employer, it may be
beneficial in the long run for employees to keep their employers' costs down
as well. The expenses that employers put into the cost of litigation could
affect employees through lower wages or reduced share value.6 A 1997 U.S.
General Accounting Office study pointed out two specific companies that
established alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs after suffering the
consequences of the expense litigation had on their company." The first
developed its ADR program after it spent $400,000 defending itself
successfully against an employment claim.68 The company had to spend that
large sum of money in litigation costs to come out the winner; the costs are
obviously exponentially higher for those companies that do not win their
claim because of the additional cost of damages. Another company in the
same situation spent $1 million in attorneys' fees to successfully defend a
claim.6 ' After the companies implemented their ADR programs, their legal
expenses dropped drastically; the first company's legal fees went down by 90
percent.o The new ADR program, consisting of a combination of arbitration
6 Id.
65 Id.
66 Hans A. von Spakovsky, The Unfair Attack on Arbitration: Harming Consumers
by Eliminating a Proven Dispute Resolution System, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (July
17, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/the-unfair-attack-on-
arbitration-harming-consumers-by-eliminating-a-proven-dispute-resolution-system.
67 Id. (Although these new ADR programs used mediation as well as arbitration
methods to solve disputes, these situations are still excellent examples of how much
litigation really costs a company. Both of these companies were successful in their cases,
but were required to spend a lot of money to come out that way. This article recommends
choosing only arbitration as a dispute resolution method, but these ADR programs using
an arbitration/mediation combination method are still good examples of the difference in
cost between litigation and other resolution systems.)
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id
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and mediation, cost less than half of the legal fees that the company used to
spend on just on employment litigation matters.' The program also
increased the amount of settlements, so employees were still able to have
their claims recognized in a beneficial dispute resolution method and come
out with some type of compensation. 72
One of the major benefits of an arbitral decision-making process as
opposed to litigation is the ability of the parties to choose who will be
deciding the dispute. The parties can base this decision off of many different
characteristics, including: "subject matter expertise, reputation or
competence, temperament; number of years of experience; number of
arbitrations chaired, availability, and commitment and ability to conduct an
efficient, cost-effective arbitration." In court cases, judges are assigned
without regard to the parties' wishes or concerns. 74 Because the Fair Pay and
Safe Workplaces order prohibits making these decisions pre-dispute through
a mandatory arbitration agreement, all of these terms will have to be agreed
upon post dispute. This presents a challenge for disagreeing parties to come
together and agree on the terms of their resolution process, which is one
aspect that may give employees a reason to lean towards litigation. But even
this problem with arbitration can be overcome, because most arbitral
tribunals provide for a method of arbitrator selection in the case that the
parties cannot agree. In fact, many of the terms needed for an arbitration
proceeding can be filled in by the arbitral tribunal.7 ' This means that in the
worst-case scenario, if the parties absolutely cannot agree on anything, the
rules will be decided for them, just as they would in a courtroom. In the
best-case scenario, the parties are free to choose their arbitrator(s), and take
advantage of the flexibility of the arbitral process that will be discussed in
more detail below.
Obtaining counsel for employment litigation cases has become a real
problem for plaintiffs suing their employers. In reality, in order for an
employee to get an attorney for an employment case she would need a claim
worth at least $60,000 for an attorney to be willing to represent her.79 One of
71 von Spakovsky, supra note 66.
72 Id
" Sussman & Wilkinson, supra note 52.
74 Id.
75 AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, supra note 62.
76 Id.
77 Id
7 von Spakovsky, supra note 66.
79 Id.
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the founders of the National Employment Lawyers' Association testified,
"employment attorneys turned away at least 95% of employees who sought
representation."so Because of the economic realities of the litigation system,
one study showed that only around 5% of employees that claim to have been
discriminated against actually have access to litigation." In light of the
increased cost associated with litigation combined with the difficulty of
retaining counsel, employees either have to option to pursue a less expensive
method, such as arbitration, or drop the claim and remain empty-handed.
Despite the evidence presented above, another case study found that the
counsel fees for arbitration tend to be higher than those for litigation.82 The
study looks at 19 single plaintiff cases, 9 of which were solved through
arbitration and 10 of which were solved through litigation. The arbitration
outside counsel fees totaled an aggregate of $710,323.50, averaging
$78,924.84 per case, while the litigation total for counsel fees was
$631,443.28 and averaged only $63,144.33 per case." Total costs for
arbitration, including the whole proceeding and cost of counsel, totaled to
$921,042.22, with an average per-case expenditure of $102,338.02.85 Total
litigation costs including outside counsel, added up to $704,908.20, with an
average per-case expenditure of $70,490.82.86 While this study shows that
arbitration costs an additional $15,000.00 per case in outside counsel alone,
and an additional $30,000.00 total per case total, the study does not clarify
the subject matter of the disputes." This article is not concerned with an
overall comparison of arbitration versus litigation in the corporate context
but is focused solely on the advantages of choosing arbitration for
discrimination and sexual harassment claims. While a study such as this one
may provide some insight and create doubts as to whether arbitration is
cheaper as a whole, it does not provide definite evidence that it is more
expensive for employees bringing claims relevant to the Fair Pay and Safe
Workplaces Order.
8 0 Id.
81 Id
82 Alan Dabdoub & Trey Cox, Which Costs Less: Arbitration or Mediation? (Dec. 6,
2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/12/06/which-costs-less-arbitration-or-
litigation.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87Id
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D. Win Rates
"Employment discrimination plaintiffs do worse than other plaintiffs-
they have to go to trial more often because they are less likely to obtain a
favorable early disposition; they win those trials less often; they face
proportionately more appeals from those wins; they suffer proportionately
more reversals of those wins."" From 1988-2000, there were 859
employment discrimination cases decided by federal courts out of 5,173 total
decided cases. 9 Of the 859 relevant cases, plaintiffs only won 268 of them.90
These statistics do not take into account the appeals process, but look solely
at the win rate for plaintiffs at the district level.9 ' It is hard to find an exact
comparison of employment litigation claims and employment arbitration
claims. For example, from 1997-2001, 2,159 employment cases were filed
with the American Arbitration Association. 92 This data compared to the
previous litigation data suggests that there are substantially more arbitration
employment cases filed than litigation; however, the 859 court cases were
actually decided by the court (and federal court at that. State court cases were
not included in these numbers), whereas the 2,159 arbitration cases were
simply filed.93 This article has already addressed how the majority of
employment discrimination cases are settled, so that may account for the
large discrepancy in data.94
Another study that attempts to do a direct comparison of win rates in
employment litigation versus employment arbitration seems to align quite
well with the data addressing appeal win rates.95 Lewis Malthy states that
employees were successful in 63% of arbitration claims and only successful
in 14.9% of court cases.96 One researcher has discovered that the win rates
88 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment-Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Court, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 455 (2004).
89 Id.
91 Id
9 Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment
Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 DisP. REsOL. J. 44 (2004).
93 Id
94 See Sussman & Wilkinson, supra note 52.
9 Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 92.
9 Id. (Even this direct comparison is not perfectly on point with the Fair Pay and
Safe Workplaces Act effects; however, because "he compared arbitrated disputes that are
not dominated by employment discrimination claims with litigated discrimination
disputes.")
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for employment discrimination claims depend on whether the case was
decided by judge or jury." "[E]mployment discrimination plaintiffs have
won only 19.29 percent of judge trials but 37.77 percent of jury trials.
Although employment discrimination plaintiffs have won fewer than one in
five of their judge trials, other plaintiffs have won 45.91 percent of their
judge trials (and 44.82 percent of their jury trials)." 98 This data suggests
employees are more successful with a jury trial and reinforces the idea that
employment discrimination claims do not fair as well in a judicial setting as
other types of claims.
Within arbitration, there seems to be a difference of success rates
depending upon the salary of the employee bringing the claim. 99 In the
American Arbitration Association, employees bringing civil rights related
claims with a classified "high salary" had a win rate of 40%.00 Employees
bringing civil rights related claims with a classified "lower salary" had a win
rate of 24.3%.o' This data, collected from 1999 and 2000, actually showed
that court claims had a higher success rate for employees than arbitration.
State court employment discrimination trials yielded a 43.8% win rate for
employees, while federal court employee discrimination trials showed a
36.4% win rate for employees.1 02
In conclusion, researchers do not seem to have a solid grasp on which
forum, either the judicial setting or the arbitral tribunal, provides higher
success for employees bringing employment discrimination and sexual
harassment claims. The Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Order, as an initiative
put in place to protect employees, seems to insinuate by banning mandatory
arbitration that employees will be more successful in the courtroom, but
there just is no solid evidence to support that claim. Therefore, the Order
does not have any impact on the success employees can have with their
claims, regardless of the forum in which they are brought.
* Clermont & Schwab, supra note 88, at 458.
9 Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 92.
9 Id.
' Id
1o1 Id.
102 Id
195
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
E. Even When Plaintiffs are Given the Opportunity to Appeal in
Litigation, They are Rarely Successful
One of the many reasons that arbitration is both cheaper and quicker than
litigation is because there is limited ability to appeal the arbitral decision. 0 3
This can be seen as a pitfall of the arbitral system; however, studies show
that when plaintiffs do appeal the court's decision, they are very rarely
successful.' 04 Therefore, losing the chance to go through the appeal process
is not actually a negative aspect of arbitration because those employee
appellants do not often succeed anyway.
Employment litigation is an extremely common topic seen in the federal
courts and is now the largest single category of cases, making up 10% of the
entire federal civil docket.' Of these employment cases, Title VII claims
make up the majority.106 The study providing these statistics also shows that
almost 70% of employment discrimination cases are finally resolved by
settlement.' The cases that are not settled but are decided by a court
judgment show that employment discrimination claims have a higher appeal
rate than other types of claims, and of these, plaintiffs' appeals are 17 times
more frequent than defendants' appeals.'0o This means that employment
cases are much more likely to be appealed than other types of cases, and
plaintiffs are much more likely to be the party doing the appealing. Despite
this, defendants are more likely to actually succeed and get a reversal upon
appeal (keep in mind that defendants in employment discrimination cases are
the companies).'0 9 In fact, defendants in employment discrimination cases
actually do better in appeals than defendants of other types of cases, and
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases actually do worse in appeals
than those of other types." 0 In all types of cases, the total reversal rate for
defendants is 31% and for plaintiffs is 14%, but in employment
103 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 88 at 457. (The general assertion is that
there is no ability to appeal an arbitral decision, however, there are very few grounds in
which a party actually can appeal to the judicial court system and ask for review there.
These grounds are beyond the scope of this article and are mostly procedural, not based
upon the merits.)
" Id. at 452.
105 Id.
106d.
18Id.
'0 See id.
0 Id.
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discrimination cases, the reversal rate for defendants is 42% and for plaintiffs
is only 8%."' Employees should be careful about choosing litigation over
arbitration solely because of the right to appeal. The 8% success rate on
appeal is daunting on its own, especially compared to the chance that the
employee will initially come out successful and the employer will take
advantage of those appeal rights and have a 42% chance of reversal." 2 As
easy as it may be to reach for a venue that allows appeals, these statistics
highlight that an appeal is likely to cost more money over more time and lead
to more disappointment for a plaintiff in a discrimination or harassment case.
F. Dispute Resolution Involves Humans Subject to Human Behavior
Expanding upon the lack of appeal rights in arbitration is the human
behavioral aspect of the need for finality. Conflict resolution is a necessary
part of human interaction, and recently, legal scholars have also become
interested in how behavioral aspects come into play within resolution
systems."' While the inability to appeal in most circumstances may be
considered a downfall, it seems as though the finality that comes with an
arbitral decision may be worth more than meets the eye. "[A]lthough
necessary and important in some cases, conventional legal processes, like
adjudication and adversarial negotiation, are often inadequate for a fuller
satisfaction of human needs and interests, and so we must look to other
processes than traditional institutions or practices, depending on the kind of
conflict or dispute at issue."ll4 Humans instinctively look for a resolution
process that they will be comfortable in, will give them a fair result, and ends
the conflict they were facing. While it is obvious litigation does meet each of
these goals, arbitration may do a better job of satisfying those needs and
meeting those subconscious standards. "[F]airness in procedures for
resolving conflicts is the fundamental kind of fairness, and that it is
acknowledged as a value in most cultures, places, and times: fairness in
procedure is an invariable value, a constant in human nature."". The idea of
process pluralism, the ability for all parties to be heard in a dispute, is an
'" Id
112 d
113 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and Human
Problem Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a Multidisciplinary Context, 54 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 7,4-27 (2004).
114 Id at 4.
15 Id at 7.
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area which makes arbitration much more attractive to the typical plaintiff.i1 6
Studies have shown that some parties to arbitration feel much more likely to
be heard than others who proceed with a litigation route."' More modem
studies have even shown that the ability to actually participate is another
growing need for humans engaged in conflict resolution."' Parties to
arbitration are still represented by attorneys, but they are given much more
reign to participate and engage in the process as opposed to litigation where
parties sit quietly next to their counsel and leave their fate purely in their
attorney's hands. Parties to arbitration also have the ability to construe their
own arbitration agreements, which is a huge way for the plaintiff to feel
involved and interactive in his or her dispute resolution process.
One thing to keep in mind as employment discrimination/ sexual
harassment plaintiffs make their choice between litigation and arbitration is
what the goal actually is. Now that the Executive Order provides these
plaintiffs with options, if both plaintiffs and attorneys keep these goals in
mind the arbitration may very likely serve as a solid system in which to reach
and accomplish them.
In many conflicts people act in a way that seems to go against their
interests. Sometimes they seem more interested in having their day
in court than in arriving at a solution that gives them what they need.
They are sometimes more interested in expressing their feelings than
getting results. . . . Lewis Coser proposes two components of conflict
in his classic work, The Functions of Social Conflict (1956). One,
which he labels "unrealistic," is people's need for some form of
energy release. The other component, which he labels "realistic," is
people's desire for a result that will meet their needs. The unrealistic
component will not be satisfied by a good solution, but instead
requires listening, ventilation, acknowledgment, validation, a day in
court, or some means of expressing or releasing the feelings and
energy associated with a conflict. The realistic component requires a
satisfactory solution, one that addresses people's essential
interests. 19
"16 Id.
"
7 Id at 9.
'19 Bernard S. Mayer, The Dynamics of Conflict: A Guide to Engagement and
Intervention, 1-14 (2d ed. 2012).
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Keeping that information in mind, the aspects of arbitration that this article
has already discussed, such as the timing, cost, and effectiveness of
arbitration, the alternative dispute resolution system may be more effective
and meet the needs of plaintiffs better than the traditional litigation route.
Arbitration will accomplish both the unrealistic needs of being heard and
acknowledged (having "a day in court") as well as the realistic component of
reaching a solution that satisfies their essential interests.120
G. Arbitration Creates More Flexibility for the Parties
Another reason why employees will be likely to stick with an arbitration
dispute resolution process even when it is not mandated is because of the
flexibility of the resolution method. With arbitration, the parties work with
the arbitrators to schedule hearings and deadlines.12' These meetings can
occur at more convenient locations as determined by the parties or after
normal business hours if needed; whereas, the court system must adhere to
strict protocol.1 22 In arbitration, witnesses can be questioned out of order if it
is more convenient, over the telephone or video chat, or even using written
testimony in place of in-person testimony.1 23 The same can be said for
experts needed during the proceedings.' 2 ' The parties also have the option to
contract the timing of the resolution process.' 25 They can set deadlines, limit
the amount of time to be spent on each phase of the arbitration, and then hold
each other accountable throughout the process in order to stick to those
goals.1 26 Contracting out these types of terms in an arbitration agreement is
usually easier to do pre-dispute, so the preclusion of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements done by the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces order actually lessens
some of these flexibility benefits common to arbitration practice. It is much
harder for parties in dispute to agree to these terms once they are already in a
hostile relationship. Regardless of the potential tension between the parties at
this point, coming to an agreement on the flexible terms of arbitration is in
both parties' best interest and therefore provides incentive for them to get
120 Id. at 12.
121 Sussman & Wilkinson, supra note 52.
122 Id
123 Id
124 d12 5 d
126 Id
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along long enough to set limitations and restrictions on their resolution
method.
H. Arbitration is More Confidential
Confidentiality is often considered a valuable trait of arbitration for both
the employee and the employer. Employers obviously have a stake in
keeping discrimination and sexual harassment claims quiet, but employees
asserting these claims can also benefit from a more confidential method of
dispute resolution. Many times victims of sexual harassment will choose not
to seek compensation at all because of the public nature of a trial and having
to speak openly about personal issues. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") places an emphasis on maintaining the employee's
confidentiality wherever possible, in order to encourage other potential
victims to come forward.127 While there are laws in place to prevent
employers from retaliating against employees that speak out about sexual
harassment in the workplace,' 28 that does not make it any easier for the
employee personally. The Seventh Circuit has openly stated in Union Oil
that, "[p]eople who want secrecy should opt for arbitration. When they call
on the courts, they must accept the openness that goes with subsidized
dispute resolution by public (and publicly accountable) officials." 2 9
Arbitration hearings are held in private, with only designated members
present such as the parties and their counsel.' 30 The content of these hearings
should also contractually be made confidential."' All members of the arbitral
proceedings that are present at the hearings should agree not to go to the
press about specific issues or the entire proceeding in general.'32 These
precautions help keep private hearings just between those that are involved
and engaged in the proceeding and away from members of the general public
and the media."' Trial proceedings, on the other hand, are held publicly at
the courthouse.134 Although counsel can request for the record to be sealed
127 Ida L. Castro, Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability for
Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors (1999), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
harassment.html.
128 Sussman & Wilkinson, supra note 52.
129 Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000).
130 Sussman & Wilkinson, supra note 52.131 Id
132Id
133 Id
134
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and to be kept confidential, this very seldom is granted.' 35 The courts have a
responsibility to keep public proceedings just that: public, while arbitrational
institutions do not have that incentive and therefore often have
confidentiality rules built into their guidelines."' An article from the New
York Law Journal warns against this "false security;" however, and
emphasizes the importance of contractually protecting confidentiality and
not approaching the arbitration with a false presumption of security.'
Confidentiality also comes with one possible pitfall for employees
asserting discrimination or harassment claims: employers that are threatened
by lawsuit may be more likely to settle with an employee because of the
public nature and embarrassment that could accompany the lawsuit.138 While
this may be a huge factor in an employee's choice to pursue litigation, there
is legislation passed that counteracts any benefit that this strategy may
have.'39 Due to public outcry over cases that settled privately involving
"toxic tort claims, design defects, sexual harassment, and the Catholic
Church's sexual abuse scandal," there are now laws in place that limit the
ability to make private, confidential settlements relating to these types of
claims.'40 This type of legislation places enormous barriers on the ability to
keep matters private and confidential during a litigation proceeding, while
arbitration remains open to become a contracted "safe haven."
I. Settlement
So what is the effect of settlement on employment discrimination and
sexual harassment claims? Many agree that Congress intended to encourage
voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims.' 4 ' According to a
University of Pennsylvania Law Review Article, approximately 70% of all
employment discrimination claims end in settlement.142 If this is true, it may
support the idea that the changes implemented through the Fair Pay and Safe
Workplaces Order will have minimal effect. If an employee brings a claim
13 Id.
"' Sussman & Wilkinson, supra note 52.
'3 Samuel Estreicher & Steven C. Bennett, The Confidentiality of Arbitration
Proceedings, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 13, 2008.
138 Id.139Id
140 d
141 Robert D. Friedman, Confusing the Means for the Ends: How A Pro-Settlement
Policy Risks Undermining the Aims of Title VII, 161 U. PA. L. REv. 1361, 1363 (2013).
142 Id
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through arbitration, nothing has changed because that is what she was
previously required to do, but if she chooses to pursue her new option of
litigation then the case is more than likely going to settle out of court
anyway.1 43
IV. THE POTENTIALLY NEGATIVE SIDE OF ARBITRATION
Arbitrators Lack Diversity; Employees Bringing Discrimination or
Sexual Harassment Claims May Feel More Comfortable in a Forum
Where They are More Likely to Get a Decision Maker ofSimilar Race
or Gender
While a lot of the statistics on arbitrator diversity are outdated, it is
alarming that there was such a lack of diversity in the profession even thirty
years ago. In 1985, 91.5% of all arbitrators were male, and 96.5% of all
arbitrators were white.'44 Therefore, even though parties have the opportunity
to choose their arbitrators, it was almost 100% certain that you would be
choosing a white male.1 45 There are entire articles on the problems this
uniform arbitrator pool present; however, for the purposes of the claims that
fall within the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Order, the problems are
especially apparent. As an employee bringing a claim against a corporation,
it may be important to feel like the decision maker of the claim understands
where the plaintiff is coming from in order to lessen that small-player
feeling. If a plaintiff is bringing a sexual harassment claim and is female, it
may be important to her to have a female decision maker in order to help her
feel comfortable; to help her feel that she is understood; and to help her feel
like someone is able to see her point of view. In 1985, this was impossible.1 46
This is not a new concern for researchers of arbitration. A 1999 article states:
143 Id
144 Nicole Buonocore, Resurrecting A Dead Horse-Arbitrator Certification As A
Means to Achieve Diversity, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 483 (1999) (The average
arbitrator, was not only a white male, but was also about 60 years old. This lack of youth
may also contribute to a plaintiff in an employment claim feeling unrepresented because
the 60-year-old white male arbitrator is probably able to connect with the corporation
easier than with a young female of a different race).145 d
146 Id
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Apart from diversity for diversity's sake, it is possible that awards
rendered by women and minorities may be different from awards
rendered by white males. While there is little or no data regarding
whether female arbitrators decide cases differently than male
arbitrators, one study correlated arbitrator age to arbitration awards.
Results indicated that an arbitrator's age did play a role in how a case
was decided. If age affects an arbitrator's award, one can presume
that gender will also affect awards. This is especially true in sexual
harassment cases, which are becoming more common. As labor
forces grow more diverse in terms of both gender and race, the true
beneficiaries of the arbitration process, the employees, may begin to
question whether a system dominated by white male arbitrators is
fair. A task force investigating due process concerns associated with
arbitrating non-union employment relationships suggested that 'the
roster . . . should be established on a non-discriminatory basis,
diverse by gender, ethnicity, background, experience, etc. to satisfy
the parties that their interest and objectives will be respected and
fully considered. .. ' 14 7
Now that employees have the ability to choose between arbitration and
litigation after the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Order, the evidence of lack
of diversity in arbitration may be enough to turn plaintiffs off of arbitration
and lead them towards litigation. But, when data of the diversity in the
judicial system is analyzed, the odds of getting a judge that is not a white
male are not much better. As of 2009, there had been 110 Supreme Court
Justices since it's founding in 1789, and 106 of them have been white
males.1 48 At the state level, 24 state supreme courts are entirely white, and
two are entirely male.1 4 9 While white males are only about 37.5% of the
general population of the United States, they make up about 66% of judges
on state appellate benches.so Because of the lack of diversity in both
arbitration and litigation, it does not seem to matter where an employee
brings a sexual harassment or employment discrimination claim. The only
difference is that in litigation, employees are more likely to face a diverse
pool in a jury trial made up of their peers. This may be enough to convince
147 Id
148 Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, A Bench That Looks Like America: Diversity Among
Appointed State Court Judges, JUDGES' J., (Summer 2009).
149Id
150
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plaintiffs to go to the courtroom now that they have the chance after the
signing of the Order, but it does not seem to be an overwhelming reason to
stray from voluntary arbitration.
V. ARBITRATION RESULTS V. LITIGATION RESULTS
A. Award Amounts
Another key aspect for employees to consider when given the option to
pursue either arbitration or litigation after the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces
Order is their potential award if their claim is successful. One study
interested in this aspect created two groups of decision makers: one made up
of professional arbitrators, another made up of jury eligible citizens."' This
study faced the groups with a medical negligence case and asked each to
decide the damages to be awarded for past pain and suffering and
disfigurement.'52 The median arbitration award was $57,000 and the mean
was about $50,000, while the median mock-jury award was $49,000 and the
mean was about $52,000.'53 Even though this study was not based upon
employment discrimination cases, it is a good representation of the
essentially non-existent difference of award amounts between arbitrators and
jurors. An economist created a very similar study but in the context of
automobile accidents in the state of California.1 54 His study yielded the same
results: there was no significant difference between arbitral award amounts
and jury award amounts.'s Even though some of these statistics seem to
yield an inconclusive result, there is definitely no evidence that litigation is
actually better in terms of award amounts; therefore, with the option now to
choose between arbitration and litigation under the Fair Pay and Safe
Workplaces Order a plaintiff should not be swayed in either direction.
Other researchers have discovered a difference in discrepancies of
arbitral awards and litigated damages depending upon the salary range of the
employee.s' Unfortunately, there is a lack of court cases brought by lower
income employees, probably due to their inability to afford the costs of
' Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 92.
1 52 Id
'"I d at 45.
154 Id
1' Id .
116Id at 50.
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litigation."' Therefore, there is no way to compare employees with lower
income's cases to those with a lower income that brought arbitration
claims.' However, higher income employees' claims could be compared."'
The study showed that in both arbitration and litigation the median award
amount exceeded $65,000, but there was no significant difference in award
amounts between the two.1 6 0 Because the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces
Order was signed in order to protect employee plaintiffs by allowing them so
seek resolution in a judicial setting, it would be easy to assume that they
would fare better in the courtroom in terms of win rates and award amount.
Despite this easy assumption, there is no statistical evidence to prove its
truth. Therefore, employees are just as likely to stick with arbitration now
that it is no longer mandatory
B. Repeat Player Issues
One of the things that the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Order may have
been trying to prevent by banning mandatory arbitration agreements is the
"Repeat Player" issue. This problem occurs when a party becomes a regular
participant in the arbitration process and becomes familiar to the arbitrators
and arbitral tribunals." With a lot of employer disputes, employees are
represented by unions so both the employer and the union become repeat
players within the system.162 This repeat player effect is actually beneficial
for both parties, because they have had the ability to find arbitrators that
issue awards that are fair and reasonable to both sides.' If an arbitrator
favored one side, the other would not allow that arbitrator to preside over the
next issue between the two parties." This increases the reliability and
fairness of the arbitration system, and the repeat player effect is actually a
benefit.' 5 This phenomenon becomes an issue; however, when the employee
is not represented by a union so the only repeat player is the employer.1 6 6
1s7 Id
159Id
16s Id
16' Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, I EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189 (1997).
1 62  d
163 Id
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The employer has a chance to use prior experience to know which arbitrators
favor employers or issue the stingiest awards, etc.167 The employees on the
other hand have no experience with the arbitration system, and unless they
are represented by a lawyer that is extremely familiar with this situation then
they are going into the arbitration essentially blind and having to rely upon
the employer's (their opponent's) experience.1 68 Even if there is an attorney
that often deals with employment discrimination or sexual harassment
arbitration, the attorney would have to personally be aware of the results of
previous cases because the lack of public disclosure often protects companies
from setting a pattern or "precedent" with arbitral awards.1 6 9
VI. CONCLUSION: LACK OF ACTUAL EFFECT OF THE ORDER ON
EMPLOYEE CLAIMS
The Department of Labor estimates that there are roughly 24,000
businesses with federal contracts, and about 28 million employees under
those contracts. 70 While this number may seem large, only a small fraction
of these federal employees will actually bring employment discrimination
claims. Taking into consideration all of the factors discussed, such as time,
cost, reliability, diversity, and success rates, employees should feel that
arbitration is a safe and secure place to bring employment discrimination and
sexual harassment claims. Arbitration was developed as an alternative to
litigation, and regardless of the Executive Order no longer allowing
mandatory arbitration clauses, employees should still see it as the beneficial
substitute it was designed to be.
16 7 Bingham, supra note 161.
16 1 d. (Arbitral tribunals are not bound by precedent, but the lack of disclosure may
make it easier for employers to "structure arbitration to their advantage unilaterally.")
170 Chaunce Stanton, Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order, GovDocs
(Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.govdocs.com/fair-pay-safe-workplaces-executive-order/.
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